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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE AND USEFULNESS OF SECURITY
SO TWARE IN DETECTING COMPUTER ABUSE
William D. Nance
Detmar W. Straub
Curtis L. Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota
ABSTRACT
Computer security remains an important issue in the management of organizational information
systems. Losses resulting from computer abuse and errors are substantial, and IS managers continue
to cite security and control as a key management issue. With continued expansion of clistributed data
processing and storage, the need to both prevent and detect violations also increases. This latter
aspect, detection of computer abuse incidents, is the focus of this study.
This empirical study examines the prevalence and sophistication of security software system installa-
tions across the United States. Using a victimization survey of 528 randomly-selected DPMA mem-
bers, the study examines discovered incidents of computer abuse in organizations and attempts to iden-
tify relationships between comprehensive (i.e., sophisticated) security software and successful discovery
of abuse.
More comprehensive security software was found to be associated with greater ability to identify
perpetrators of abuse and to discover more serious computer abuse incidents. Larger organizations
used both a greater number and more sophisticated security software systems than smaller organiza-
tions. Wholesale/retail trade organizations used less comprehensive software than average, while
manufacturing organizations and public utilities used more comprehensive software. Surprisingly, no
relationships were found between the maturity of an organization's security function and the number
and/or sophistication of security software systems utilized.
1. INTRODUCTION increased detection activities (AICPA 1984) and through
appropriate punishment of perpetrators of abuse (Straub
Concerns over computer security continue to play an im- and Nance 1987). Cumulatively, these findings suggest
portant role in the management of organizational infor- that organizations with more proactive security functions
mation systems. Losses resulting from intentional abuse significantly reduce their risk.
of computer systems appear to be substantial; in fact,
they have been described as "enormous" by the American
Bar Association (1984). The ABA survey reported total 2. STUDY CONTEXT
dollar losses from computer abuse of approximately $.5
billion per year in only 72 firms. Losses from uninten- As computerization of the workplace has progressed over
tional misuse of systems, or error, further compound the the last several decades, organizations have upgraded
problem (Alavi and Weiss 1985). Evidence for the im- their control systems (Manuel 1984; Walden 1985). Most
portance of security is also provided by the frequency of these control systems tend to focus on deterrents (e.g.,
with which security and control is cited as a key manage- administrative policy statements) and on preventives, both
ment issue by I/S managers (Brancheau and Wetherbe software-based (e.g., user ID/passwords) and non-soft-
1987; Dickson, et al. 1984; Sprague and McNurlin 1986). ware-based (e.g., physical security of computer re-
sources).
Because of heightened realization of the importance of
I/S security to organizational survival, research has been However, deterrent and preventive countermeasures are
growing on effective techniques for reducing abuse. The not foolproof; abuse incidents occur and can only be dis-
picture which is emerging supports the intuitive notion covered "ex-post facto.' The problem is that organiza-
that internal controls and other forms of computer secu- tions tend to rely on normal systems controls and acci-
rity can minimize computer abuse. Policy statements and dental discovery to detect abuses which slip through the
an active security administration function, for example, protective net. Straub and Nance (1987) report that only
are believed to reduce the number of abuse incidents one of six of abuse incidents is discovered by proactive
(Straub 1986a). Deterrence is further provided through detection activities, possibly because detection activities
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tend to be "fishing expeditions" and are not targeted rity" (Simmons 1984), ranging from applications programs
enough to be successful. The contention is that "security and databases to files, records, and fields (Everest 1986).
administrators should give increased attention to detec- Detective software features are items such as transaction
tion" (p. 27). Thus, a sound organizational computer se- log reports and audit trails used in monitoring and
curity strategy not only requires utilization of deterrent tracking computer use activities (Squillace 1985; Clyde
and preventive countermeasures, but also requires a re- 1987).
pertoire of detective activities to uncover incidents which
slip through prior security nets. The current study uses these characteristics to differen-
tiate "system sophistication" based on the "comprehensive-
The computer security model in Figure l depicts the pro- ness" of coverage provided by various types of software.
cess of preventing and detecting computer abuse inci- "Low" sophistication operating systems (OS) target secu-
dents. The primary objective of computer security is to rity at the level of account and/or database/file access
minimize undiscovered abuse through a combination of control only; they provide basic recording of violation at-
deterrents, preventives, and detection activities. Many tempts (Downs 1984). "Mid-level" sophistication database
potential perpetrators are deterred by administrative poli- management system (DBMS) and fourth generation lan-
cics, employee training, and visible security functions. guage (4GL) packages target access control at finer levels
Some abusers are not deterred, though, and their at- of granularity, specifically records, fields, or statistical
tempted abuse must be thwarted by preventives. If the summaries; they, too, provide relatively simple records of
preventives work, the attempt is foiled. If the preventives unauthorized activities (Butterworth 1984; Everest 1986;
fail, however, detection is the last screen in attempting to Van der Lans 1986). At a "high" level of sophistication,
uncover abuses. specialized security software packages are comprehensive
systems providing both a wide range of access control
g,Lutint.1 Entitatill Qnlactinct
A).*,1,1.*. Polk:*' SIa... SO.-". S,cur'ly Son.ar.
capabilities, plus detailed "tracking" or transaction logs of
Vis- &..* Ful.k. Phys= R..... .1-.1 COIN all activity taking place regarding system activity (Squil-
lace, 1985; Clyde, 1987).
OS-level controls are the predominant type of security
Ab/' F..Bar.7 software available, with generally optional security fea-
tures built into nearly all mainframe and minicomputer
cerned with file access control, using procedures such as
operating systems. OS-level systems are primarily con-
user ID and passwords, designation of read-write-delete-(3ii*--«' execute capabilities, multiuser restrictions, and data en-
cryption (Cashin 1986; Littman 1984). While focusing
FIGURE 1. Computer Security Model primarily on access control, OS security systems may also
provide elementary detection features such as access vio-
lation logs. These logs note items such as date, time,
As noted in Figure 1, use of security software to detect location, and number of attempted unauthorized accesses.
successful incidents of abuse, the last section of the
model, is the focus of the current study. More specifi- DBMS and 4GL systems typically work hand-in-hand, as
cally, the study attempts to determine if comprehensive- 4GLs are used to access data stored within DBMSs.
ness of security software is a factor in successful detective Similar to operating systems, DBMS/4GL security fea-
activities. Security software is certainly not a panacea for tures are also optional and primarily concerned with ac-
all security problems and is not necessarily appropriate in cess control. However, DBMSs provide more fine-tuned
all situations and for all types of abuse. It may, however, access controls than operating systems by providing user
be helpful in improving detection in some settings. Thus, access to pre-defined portions or "views" of the database,
this study attempts to determine the organizational fac- restricting users' ability to update data or modify database
tors associated with use of security software, and to deter- structures, and controlling simultaneous access (Van der
mine the degree to which more sophisticated software Lans 1986). With a DBMS configured to provide diffe-
improves detection of abuse. rent users with different views, 4GL queries formulated to
retrieve data can be checked against individual users' pre-
specified access rights. Once again, DBMS/4GL systems
3. TYPES OF SECURITY SOFTWARE are not limited to access control; they too can provide
simple detection features reporting attempted unautho-
Security software provides both preventive and detective rized accesses.
features. Preventive software provides "access control,"
also known as "logical" or "programmed" controls, and Finally, speciah-zed sojhvare systems are packages written
may operate at varying levels. Software systems, for ex- for the sole purpose of providing security. This is clearly
ample, can limit use to finer and finer "levels of granula- in contrast with OS and DBMS/4GL software where se-
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curity features are optional and ancillary to the primary security software is utilized in organizations. Data on
function of the software. As with other types of security sophistication, or quality, helps us to understand factors
software, specialized systems provide access and activity associated with more or less comprehensive security soft-
restrictions. They are most commonly differentiated from ware. Finally, data on relationships between software
less sophisticated controls, though, by their advanced sophistication and successful computer abuse detection
transaction logging capabilities, which in turn provide helps explain relationships between these two constructs.
complete audit trails (Squillace 1985) and in-depth secu-
rity violations reports (Clyde 198D. In granting computer
security personnel detailed information regarding the use 4.1 Prevalence
of computer resources, specialized software packages go
far beyond simple access control; they can also actively How prevalent are security softweire systems in organiza-
monitor and fouow-up on access violations (Clyde 1987). tions today and what organizational factors are associated
A plethora of specialized security packages exist. Two with the number of systems utilized in an organization?
widely used systems, both running on 1BM equipment, The study addresses this question by evaluating whether
are Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) and Access the number of systems utilized is associated with a variety
Control Facility II (ACFII) (Cashin 1986). Many others of organizational factors. The following study questions
are also available for both IBM and non-IBM shops. were asked:
Ql Is number of security software systems related to
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS organizational size as measured by:
This study utilizes two basic constructs for assessing secu- 1.1 total assets of tho organization at all loca-
rity software installations in organizations, namely the tions?
number and sophistication of systems utilized. As noted
earlier, active and visible security functions utilizing a 1.2 total assets at the respondent's location?
variety of security techniques seem to be a successful de-
terrent to computer abuse; such organizations can be con- 1.3 EDP budget at the respondent's location?
sidered to have more "advanced" security. Within the
realm of security software, organizations utilizing both
more and more comprehensive systems are considered to Q2 Is number of security software systems related to
be more advanced than organizations with fewer and less type of industry?
sophisticated systems.
The intent of the current study is to attempt to determine Q3 Is number of security software systems related to
organizational factors associated with security software maturity of the security function?
utilization, and to evaluate whether more comprehensive
security software is associated with successful abuse de-
tection. To accomplish this objective, the study asks 4.2 Sophistication
three general research questions:
How sophisticated are security software systems used in
1. How prevalent is security software in organizations organizations today, and what organizational factors are
today and what organizational factors are associated associated with the sophistication of these systems? To
with number of systems utilized? address this question, sophistication of utilized systems
was evaluated against the same organizational factors as
2. How sophisticated is security software used in organi- in the prevalence questions. The following study ques-
zations today and what organizational factors are as- tions were asked:
sociated with the sophistication of these systems?
04 Is security software sophistication related to organiza-
3. What is the nature of the relationship between secu- tional size as measured by:
rity software sophistication and discovery of computer
abuse incidents? 4.1 total assets of the organization at all loca-
tions?
These research questions address the status of security
software from two different perspectives: quantity and 4.2 total assets at the respondent's location?
quality. Within each of these questions, several more
specific study questions were asked in order to evaluate 4.3 EDP budget at the respondent's location?
factors associated with use of security software. Data on
prevalence, or quantity of systems used across the sample, 05 Is security software sophistication related to type of
increases our understanding of the frequency with which industry?
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06 Is security software sophistication related to maturity time, they are exposed to new systems and can be ex-
of the security function? pected to implement a greater number of these systems
to handle specific aspects of security. In turn, as expo-
sure to new systems increases, installed systems are likely
43 Discovery of Abuse to be more comprehensive.
What is the nature of the relationship between sophistica- Finally, it has been discussed throughout this article that
tion of security software systems and discovery of com- a proactive approach to security is a successful deterrent
puter abuse incidents? To address this question, sophis- to computer abuse. 07 and 08 assess this relationship in
tication of security software systems was treated as an connection with security software. While severity of
independent variable and compared with two key aspects punishment imposed on perpetrators of abuse has been
of computer abuse incidents: ability to identify perpetra- shown to be a successful deterrent (Straub and Nance
tors and seriousness of the abuse (Straub and Nance 1987), such punishments are predicated upon identifica-
1987). As noted earlier, ability to detect abuse may be tion of the perpetrators. 07 explores the ability of
dependent upon available information detailing unautho- sophisticated software to make such identifications. Simi-
rized activities. While OS and DBMS/4:GL security fea- larly, in attempting to target abuse detection activities,
tures may provide modest recording and reporting capa- discovery of serious abuses should be a major objective.
bilities, it is expected that increased detail provided by Q8 evaluates whether more comprehensive security soft-
specialized software reports will facilitate more successful ware is a useful technique in discovering such incidents.
detection. The following study questions were asked:
07 Does use of more sophisticated security software in- 5. METHODOLOGY
crease an organization's ability to identify the perpe-
trator of computer abuse incidents? 5.1 Data Collection
08 Does use of more sophisticated security software in- Data for this study is part of a victimization database ob-
crease an organization's ability to uncover more tained in a prior study of computer abuse and deterrent
serious computer abuse incidents? measures (Straub 1986a). The survey instrument (see
Appendix) was validated via extensive field interviews
with 35 system professionals, interviews and questionnaire
4.4 Discussion of Study Questions responses from a group of 88, and, finally, pilot study
responses from 170. A more detailed description of the
As noted earlier, one of the primary objectives of this overall validation process is found in Straub (1986b). The
study is to add to the growing body of knowledge in the validated survey was mailed out to randomly-selected
field of computer security and abuse deterrence. Toward DPMA (Data Processing Management Association)
this end, 01 and Q4 seek to determine whether associa- members in 1986. The sample base that resulted from
tions between organizational size and use of advanced this study and the pilot group, with duplicates removed,
computer security techniques extend into the realm of was 1,063.
security software. Larger organizations spend both more
time and money on computer security and EDP audit Of the 1,063 respondents, 528 organizations reported
activities than smaller organizations (Straub 1986a); it fol- having some level of security commitment, determined by
lows that they would also be more likely to use more total personnel hours dedicated to computer security ex-
comprehensive security software. ceeding zero (question 122). These 528 organizations
with active security were chosen as the sample base be-
Another objective is to identify areas of vulnerability to cause security software is useful in detecting abuse only
computer abuse in order to assist security administrators to the extent that someone in the organization is actively
in targeting abuse detection efforts. Q2 and Q5, there- responsible for responding to reported violation attempts.
fore, examine differences between industries. Some
industries are expected to be more vulnerable to com- Finally, within these 528 organizations, 168 separate inci-
puter abuse (e.g., banking, merchandising) and may uti- dents of computer abuse were reported. Each incident
lize more comprehensive security techniques to cope with was accompanied by a separate page containing questions
this vulnerability. Individuals responsible for security in 28-43, addressing various aspects of individual abuse inci-
industries found to be below average in utilizing security dents.
software can be alerted to the situation.
To help understand underlying determinants of advanced 5.2 Measures
security, Q3 and Q6 evaluate whether use of more ad-
vanced security software is associated with maturity of the Prevalence of security software was measured on ques-
security function. As security staffs gain experience over tions 16 and 17 of the research instrument. Question 16
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assessed the number of OS and DBMS/4GL systems by tions between variables were analyzed using Chi-square
requesting the number of "SECURITY SOFTWARE contingency tables and Kruscal-Wallis tests of signifi-
SYSTEMS available and actively in use on the main- cance.
frame(s) or minicomputer(s) at this location." This study
used only the number actively in use. Question 17 mea-
sured the number of specialized systems by asking the
number of "SPECIALIZED SECURITY SOFTWARE 6. DATA ANALYSIS
SYSTEMS actively in use (examples: ACFII and RACF)."
Sophistication was also measured on questions 16 and 17, 6.1 Analysis of Prevalence Questions
as organizations reporting use of multiple system types
were collapsed into a single ranked category. In order of In answering the first research question, frequency of se-
sophistication, from least to most comprehensive, the curity software use, 83 percent of the respondent organi-
categories were: 1) None, 2) Operating System, 3) zations reported having security software "actively in use."
DBMS/4GL, and 4) Specialized Software. This col- Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondent organiza-
lapsing of responses resulted in all organizations being tions utilizing various types of security software. A sur-
included in one and only one class since organizations prising 17 percent utilized no security software at all.
were placed in the sophistication category corresponding Seventy-three percent employed security embedded in
to their highest ranked system. operating systems software, 47 percent used security em-
bedded in DBMSs and/or 4GLs, and 42 percent used
By not addressing the number of different types used, this some type of specialized security package:
classification scheme is limited. For example, an organ-
ization using five separate OS, three DBMS/4GL, and no
specialized security software packages was classified as
less sophisticated than an organization using a single spe- 80 - OS
cialized package and no OS or DBMS/4GL systems. 70 - 73%
However, since a single specialized system may well pro-
vide more extensive security than a multitude of OS and 60.
DBMS/4GL systems, this coding scheme probably accu- 50 - DBMS/4GL Specialized
rately reflects the comprehensive nature of such systems. - sw40 - 47%
42%
Maturity of the organization's security function was de- 30 .
rived from the difference between inauguration of the 20 - None
security function (question 13) and the time of the data 10 - 17%collection.
FIGURE 2. Organizational ImplementationsSedousness of the abuse was measured by question 37,
which asked "In your judgement, how serious a breach of
security was this incident?" While more objective mea-
sures of dollar losses (questions 38 and 39) were avail-
able, there is evidence (Straub and Nance 1987; Straub
1986a) that dollar loss is not as valid a measure of abuse Assuming that access control system implementations
seriousness as this subjective measure. covary with hardware installations, this usage of OS se-
curity measures is to be expected. Virtually all organiza-
Finally, identi cation of the perpetrator was measured by tions utilizing computers have operating systems security
question 43, a free-format question which read "Please modules, but not all necessarily employ either these OS
briefly describe the incident and what finally happened to controls or more sophisticated systems.
the perpetrators: Based on the responses to this item,
which were reasonably complete, successful identification Turning to the results2 of the prevalence questions
of perpetrators was coded as either yes or no. (Figure 3), several mteresting pomts arise. First, positive
relationships between size and prevalence were found.
Organizational size, as a broad construct, is clearly assoc-
iated with the number of security software systems uti-
53 Statistical Techniques lized by an organization.
Statistical techniques used to analyze the data included Second, no relationship was found between industry and
descriptive statistics and various measures of association. number of systems. Thus, no conclusions can be drawn
Descriptive statistics provide insight into the overall fre- about the tendency of one industry to use more or fewer
quency and sophistication of installed systems. Associa- security software systems than any other industry.
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Question Answer 45 - Specialized
SW40 -
Ql Is number of security software systems 42%
related to organizational size as measured 35 -
by:
30 -
1.1 total assets of the organization at Yes DBMS/4GL
all locations? 25 -
24%
1.2 total assets at the respondent' s Yes 20 -
location? None OS15 - -
1.3 EDP budget at the respondent's Yes 17% 17%
location? 10 -
Q2 Is number of security software systems No 5.
related to type of industry?
Q3 Is number of security software systems FIGURE 4. Izvel of Sophistication
related to maturity of the organization' s No
security function?
FIGURE 3. Results of Prevalence Questions The questions on software sophistication (Figure 5) dis-
covered positive relationships between organizational size
and sophistication. Larger organizations tend to utilize
more sophisticated security software systems than smaller
Third, no relationship was found between the maturity of organizations. Thus, as in the prevalence section, organi-
the security function and the number of security software zational size seems to be associated with system sophis-
systems utilized. This last finding is contrary to expecta- tication.
tions. One would expect the number of security systems
to increase as the security function ages since maturity of
the function would bring increased exposure to security Question Answer
software products and the opportunity to implement new
security procedures. One possible explanation of the Q4 Is security software sophistication related
finding is that rather than simply accumulating new sys- to organizational size as measured by:
tems, organizations tend to rep/ace old systems with new 4.1 total assets of the organization at Yesones. In other words, as they gain experience, organiza- all locations?
tions may use better systems over time. 4.2 total assets at the respondent's Yes
location?
4.3 EDP budget at the respondent's Yes6.2 Analysis of Sophistication Questions location?
Q5 Is security software sophistication YesThe second research question addressed the sophistica- related to type of industry?
tion of security software used in organizations. Figure 4
Q6 Is security software sophistication relatedshows the distribution of organizations based on the to maturity of the organization's security No
sophistication of their security software. Note that the function?
two anchors, "None" and "Specialized Software," contain
the same respective proportions of organizations (17 per- FIGURE 5. Results of Sophistication Questions
cent and 42 percent) as in the prevalence section above;
in fact, they contain the same actual respondent organiza-
tions. Collapsing multiple responses from an organization
into a sophistication ranking restricts the middle two clas- One major difference between the sophistication and pre-
sifications to organizations which have systems of no valence results was the significant relationship found bet-
higher sophistication than that type. ween industry and sophistication (Q5). In particular,
wholesale/retail trade organizations were found to utilize
Thus, 17 percent of the respondent organizations utilized /ess sophisticated systems than expected, while public uti-
on& operating system security features and another 24 lities and manufacturing organizations utilized more soph-
percent used DBMS/4GL systems either in isolation or in isticated systems.
combination with OS security features. While 42 percent
of the organizations used specialized security software, Once again, no relationship was found between maturity
only 7 percent used such systems in isolation; 35 percent of the security function and security software sophistica-
used them in combination with OS and/or DBMS/4GL tion (06). One would expect that as an EDP shop gains
systems. experience and knowledge over time, its expertise would
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also increase and more comprehensive security tools and Currently, larger organizations tend to use more sophisti-
techniques would be implemented. Surprisingly, this was cated software, as do manufacturing and public utility
not supported; older shops were not found to be more organizations. Wholesale and retail trade organizations,
likely to use ore sophisticated mechanisms than newer and smaller organizations, utilize less sophisticated soft-
shops. This implies that organizations do not necessarily ware. Organizations with less comprehensive security
experience a "learning curve" in implementing security software need to realize that security software can, in the
measures, but can implement sophisticated software pack- right setting, be effective in addressing the computer
ages early in the process of developing a security func- abuse threat.
tion.
One of the most interesting findings of the study was the
lack of association between the maturity of an organiza-
63 Analysis of Discovery of Abuse Questions tion's security function and the number and sophistication
of installed security software systems. It suggests that
The fmal research question addressed the relationship organizations do not necessarily experience a "learning
between software sophistication and aspects of abuse dis- curve" in implementing security measures. Rather, they
covery. The results of the discovery of abuse questions, may be able to introduce advanced software early in the
shown in Figure 6, indicate that sophistication of security process of developing a security function.
software is positive/y related to discovery of computer
abuse. It should be noted that there are significant ramifications
of moving rapidly into use of advanced security techni-
Question Answer ques. On the one hand, young security programs withsophisticated tools may be able to match the level of pro-
tection of mature programs without sophisticated tools.Q7 Does use of more sophisticated security software
increase an organization' i ability to identify Yes On the other hand, introduction of advanced security soft-
the perpetrator of computer abuse incidents? ware into young security environments may backfire
Q8 Does use of more sophisticated security software (Straub and Hoffer 1988). Unforescen organizational
increase an organization' s ability to uncover Yes repercussions could result from the fact that while these
more serious computer abuse incidents? systems are more sophisticated and comprehensive, they
are also more complex and may strain managerial re-
FIGURE 6. Results of Discovery of Abuse Incidents Questions sources. Moreover, if applied inappropriately, they may
be too restrictive and end up causing more problems than
they solve.
Perpetrators are more likely to be identified and serious
losses uncovered when more sophisticated software sys-
tems are utilized. Specialized security software provides 8. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
elaborate security violation reports that identify suspicious
user activity and this may lead naturally to discovery of a The current study is part of an on-going stream of re-
computer abuser (07). Serious abuse incidents also seem search into computer security and effective countermea-
to be related to sophisticated software, possibly because sures to the computer abuse threat. Prior studies in this
users are more aware of the controls and are deterred stream have demonstrated that General Deterrence
from abusing the system at more serious levels (Q8). Theory may be a useful starting point for future research
These findings are also in accord with another study since certainty and severity of sanctions imposed on per-
(Straub 1986a) which found that prevalence of security petrators of abuse have been found to be successful tech-
software lowered the rate of computer abuse in organiza- niques for curbing abuse. They have also noted the effec-
tions. tiveness of responses such as active security administra-
tors, dissemination of administrative policies and proce-
dures, and internal controls. The current study adds to
7. DISCUSSION this growing body of knowledge by demonstrating the
usefulness of security software in detecting computer
This study provides insight into the implementation of abuse.
computer-based control in organizations and raises a
number of implications for practitioners responsible for While the results here and elsewhere are highly sugges-
implementing computer security measures. It supports tive, more research is still needed. Research on the or-
the notion that organizations using "advanced" (i.e., more ganizational impacts of security software needs to re-
and better) security software can exercise better control address some of the issues raised in this paper by finding
over computer abuse. They can uncover more serious new methods for testing findings, exploring new questions
incidents of abuse. They can also unmask more perpetra- in this general context, and utilizing other theoretical ap-
tors. proaches to studying computer abuse.
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Regarding methodology, tests triangulating on the pheno- Butterworth, P. "Security-Minded System Design Can
menon with different methods are needed to affirm con- Protect Data Bases." Electronics, March 8, 1984, pp. 136-
clusions drawn to date. Security software research calls 140.
for in-depth qualitative techniques to give us a fuller un-
derstanding of the nature of security administration. Cashin, J. "As Systems Spread Out Data Becomes Vul-
Similarly, experimental techniques would increase our nerable." Sofware News, December 1986, pp. 40-48.
understanding of causal relationships.
Clyde, A. "Insider Threat on Automated Information
In addition, other questions need to be asked. For ex- Systems: Fourth Insider Threat Identification System Con-
ample, how should security software be administered on a ference, August 1987, Bethesda, MA.
day-to-day basis? How does security software impact
worker productivity? What other organizational repercus- Cohen, 1. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral
sions may occur? These and other relevant areas need Sciences. New York: Academic Press, 1969.
further study.
Dickson, G. W.; Leitheiser, R. L.; Wetherbe, J. C.; and
Finally, new theoretical bases may prove useful to subse- Nechis, M. "Key Information Systems Issues for the 80's:
quent computer abuse research. Sociological theories of MIS Qua,fer<y, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 1984, pp. 135-
deviance, for example, may help explain underlying causes 159.
of individuals' abusive behavior. Psychological theories
may aid the study of individuals' responses to organiza- Downs, D. "Operating Systems Key Security with Basic
tional efforts to reduce abuse. At · a broader organiza- Software Mechanisms." E/ectronics, March 8 1984, pp.
tional level, organizational and/or economic risk theories 122-127.
may help explain organizational reluctance to take steps
towards implementing security measures. Everest, G. Database Management Objectives, System
Functions, and Administration. New York, NY: Mc-
Graw-Hill, Inc., 1986.
9. CONCLUSION
Littman, J. "Tile Security Challenge." PC Week, Novem-
While security software does not solve the computer ber 20, 1984, pp. 67-77.
abuse problem, it is a step in the right direction. Com-
puter security techniques need to keep pace with the Manuel, T. "Computer Security." Electronics, March 8,
rising proficiency of computer users. Security software 1984, p. 121.
can be an integral part of these activities. Advanced sys-
tems provide access restrictions that prevent unauthorized Simmons, R. "An Overview of Computer Security." IBM
misuse as well as thorough tracking and reporting capabi- Systems Jouma4 Vol. 23, No. 4, 1984, pp. 309-325.
lities for discovering incidents that slip through the pre-
ventive net. The current study reinforces a growing Sprague, R., and McNurlin, C. (eds.). Information Sys-
awareness that, properly administered, computer security tems Management in Practice. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
can successfully reduce the threat of computer abuse. Prentice-Hall, 1986.
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11. ENDNOTES
1. Total percentages exceed 100 percent because many
organizations reported using more than one type of
security software system and were thus included in
multiple categories.
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APPENDIX
Section t.
Computer Abuse Questionnaire
3. NUMBEROF TOTAL YEARS EXPERIENCE IN/WITH
Personal information INFORMATION SYSTEMS?
0 More than 14 years
1. YOUR POSITION: 0 11 to 14 yearsO 7 to 10 years
0 President/Owner/Director/Chairman/Partner 0 3 to 6 years
0 Vice President/General Manager 0 Less than 3 years
0 Vice President of EDP 0 Not sure
0 Director/Manager/Head/Chief 01 EDP/MIS
0 Director/Manager of Programming Organizational Information
0 Director/Manager of Systems & Procedures
0 Director/Managerof Communications 4. Approximate ASSETS and annual REVENUES of your
O Director/Manager of EDP Operations organization:
0 Director/Managerof Data Administration ASSETS REVENUES
0 Director/ Manager of Personal Computers Atal[ Althis Mau A: this
O Director/Manager of Information Center Locations location Locat,ons location
O Data Administrator or Data Base Administritor
0 Data/Computer Security Officer 0 0
.......Over 58,Ilion.......
0 0 . . . . . . 1 Biltion-5 Billion .....0 Senior Systems Analyst O 0 .....250 Miltion-1 Billion....
0 Systems/Information Analyst 0 0 ...100 Million-250 Million...
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Applications Programmer O 0 . . . . 50 Million-100 Million . . .0 Applications Programmer 0 0 . . . .1 0 Mitlion-50 Million . . . .
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Systems Programmer 0 0 . . . . . 5 Million-10 Million ....
O Systems Programmer 0 0 . . . . .2 Million-5 Million
O Chief/Lead/Senior Operator 0 0 . . . . . 1 Million-2 Million . ....
0 Machine or Computer Operator 0 0 . . . . . . Under 1 Million . . . . . .0 0 .........Not sure.........
0 Vice President of Finance
O Controller 5. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES of *ur organization:
O Director/Manager Internal Auditing or EDP Auditirr At alt A: OWS
O Director/Manager of Plant/Building Security Locitions Location
0 EDP Auditor 10.000 or more .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0 Internal Auditor 5.000-9.9990 Consultant 2.500-4.999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 Educator 1.000-2,499
0 User of EDP 750-999..
0 Other(please specify): SOO-749..250-499..100-249..6-99
Fewer than 6
2. YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISORS POSITION: Nk* sure .
0 PresidenUO*ner/Director/Chairman/Partner
O Vice President/General Manager 6. PRIMARY END PRODUCTOR SE
RVICE<*youro,ganizationat
0 Vice Presidentof EDP this locatio
n:
O Director/Manager/Head/Chief of EDP/MIS O Manufacturing and Processing
0 Director/Managerof Programming 0 Chemical or Pharmaceutical
O Director/Managerof Systems & Procedures O Government Federal, State. Municipal includir:g Military
0 Director/ManagerofCommunications 0 Educational: Colleges Universities. and other
O Director/Managerof EDPOperations Educational Institutions
O Director/Manager of Data Administr,tion O Computer and Data Processing Servicesincluding
0 Director/Manager of Personal Computers Software Services, Service Bureaus, Time-Sharing
O Director/Managerof Information Center and Consultants
O Data/Computer Security Officer O Anance: Banking. Insurance, Real Estate. Securities,
0 SeniorSystems Analyst and Credit
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Applications Programmer 0 Trade: Wholesale and Retail
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Systems Programme 0 Medical and Legal Services
O Chief/Lead/Senior Machine or Computer Operator O Petroleum
0 Transportation Services: land, Sea, and kir
0 Vice President of Finance 0 Utilities: Communications. Electric, Gas, and
0 Controller Sanitary Services
0 Director/Manager Internal Auditing or EOP Auditing 0 Construction, Mining. and Agriculture
0 Director/Manager of Plant/Building Security 0 Other(please specify):
Are you located at Corporate Headquaders: Yes 0 No 00 Other (please specify):
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00000000000
00000000000
00000000000
00000000000
7. CITY (al this location)? STATE? 17. Other than those security software systems you listed,n
question 16. how many SPECIALIZED SECURITY SOFTWARE
8. TOTAL NUMBER OF EOP(Electronic Data Processing) SYSTEMS are actively in use? (Examples. ACFII. RACF)EMPLOYEES at this location (excluding
data input personnel): (numbef of $¢rcial,ted wcur,Ay 50 4¥*,e evuems acl,b*41 in use}0 More than 300 0 50-99
O 250-300 010-49 Olthest. howmany were purchased lroma vendo,?-
O 200-249 O Fewer than 10 (Aumber purch,$ed Worn, Injor)
0150-199 0 Not sure .. and how many were developed,n·house?
0100-149 (Iumber developed i., rouse)
9. Approximate EDP BUDGET per year of your organization 18. ThroughwhatiNFORMATIONALSOURCESarecomputersystem
at this location: users made aware OF THE APPROPRIATE AND INAPPRO
O Over $20 Million O $2-$4 Million PRIATE USES OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEM?
O $ 10-$20 Million O $1-$2 Million (Choose asmany as ipplicable)
O $8-$10 Million O Under $ 1 Million
0 $6-$8 Million 0 Not sure
0 Distributed EOP Guidelines
0 Administrative program to classify information by sensitivity0 14-$6 Million 0 Periodic dep,4,nental memosand notes
0 Distributed statements of professional ethicsComputer Security. Interrul Audit, 0 Computer Security Violations Reportsand Abuse Incident Information O Organizational meetings
0 Computer Security Awareness Training sessionsA Computer Security function in an organization is any pur- 0 Informal discussions
pose ful activity that has the objective of protecting assets such 0 Other (Please specify):
as hardware. programs, data. and computer service from lossor
misuse. Examples of personnel engaged in computer security 19. Which types of DISCIPLINARY ACTION do these infor-
functions include: data securityand systems assurance officers. mational sources mention (question 18) as consequences
For this questionnaire, computer security and EDP audit func- of purposeful computer abuse?
tions will be considered separately. (Choose as manyas applicable)
Com- EDP 0 Reprimand
Sealrity Aueil 0 Probation or suspension
10. How many staff members are O Firi.
nirlcirW 20 hours per week or more 0 Criminal prosecution
in these functions atthislocation? -(number -(rumbef 0 Civil prosecution
d per**S) 4 Penorn) 0 Other (please specify)
11. How many staff members are
working 19 hours per wtek or less in In questions 20-24, please indicate your reactions to the toi-
these functions at this location? -(number -(number lowingstatements
of per,crs) d Der=) Suor/9 NotAgree Agree Sure O'Ugree-
12. What are the tot,1 personnet hours 20. The airrer* cor,(der lecurity
per week dedicated to these eNO,twasinreactionin Ngeovt bactuator suspected pastfunctions'  ('*81 aotai rodet d Cch,v.AV at,-Me M
t w  ,43 hsurb.1,04 ea locatio4 000 0 0
13. When were these functions 21. Theacivitiescfcornouter
initiated? -1- -1- secL,ity admi<Btrators are.111
(morth/,4 1,-n lousers at thts locatic,L 0 0 0 0 0
22. The p.,Sence arld acth*ties of
cort**r security administra·
If your answer to the Computer Security part ofquestion 12 was lors deter an»,e v'ho mtcht
zers. please go directly toquestion 25. Otherms€. cor,tinut abuse the corri#YAer sys:em *t
evs kx,4,0,1 0 0 0 0 0
14. Of these total computer security personnel hours per week 23. Reativetocurtype€*ndustrycor'px*er secur*yis-4(question 12), how many are dedicated to each of the <¢fect,%*eattfus loczterl O 0 0 O 0
following? 24. Thcovvilisecisityphil©scohy
A- Physical security administration, disaster K this loc,t;or is to prmide
recovery.and contingency planniN . . . .-(hours/week) ..ry tight sectriey welout
hir-1, protuclv*y. 0 0 0 0 0
B. Data security adrninistration .......... -(hours/*mk)
C. Userandcoordinatortraining (hourE/week) 25. How many SEPARATE UNAU™ORIZED AND DELIBERATE
O. Other .. - (hours/week) INCIDENTSOFCOMPUTERABUSEhasyourorganizationat
(please specify)· this location experienced in the 3 year period, Jan. 1, 1983Jan. 1,1986?
15. EXPENDITURES per year for computer security at this (number of incidents)
location:
(Please fill out a separate ··Computer Abuse incident ReporAnnual Computer security personnel ulanes . [Blue-co#ored Section ti] for each incident)
00 you have insurance (separate policy or rider)
specifically forcomputer security losses? 26. Ho¥¥ many incidents do you have reason to suspect other
0 Yes 0 No ONot sure than those numbered above in this same 3 year period. Jan.
[f yes. what is the annual cog of such insurance . . . i 1,1983-Jan. 1,1986?
(number of suspected incidents)
16. SECURITY SOFTWARESYSTEMS zvailableand actiuly m use
on the mainfrarne<s) [or minicornoltter(s)] at this location: 27. Please briefly describe the basis (bases)for thesesuspicions.Nu.rter 04 Numbe.di= ,<32
Operating system access contiol facilities.
DBMS security access controlfacilities . . . . .
fourth Generalion soft ware access
Control facilities.......
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Section 11.
Computer Abuse Incident Report
{covering the 3yearperiod, Jan. 1. 1983-jan I. 1986)
Instructions: Please fill outa separate report foreach incidentof computerabusethat hasoccurred inthe 3 yearperiod,
Jan. 1,1983-Jan. 1,1986
28. WHEN WAS THIS INCIDENT DISCOVERED? 36. If the incident had been goin
g on for a period of time
how long was that?
Month/year - / - years :nonths
29. HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE INVOLVEDin committingthe
computer abuse in this incident? 37. In your judgment. how serious a breach of security was
this incident?
(number of perpetrators) (Choose one only)
30. POSITION(S) OF OFFENDER(S):
O Extremely serious
Main Second 0 Serious
Oflender Offender 0 Of minimal importance
Top executive 0 0 0 Not sure
Secunty o«ker 0 Of negligible importance
Auditor 0 0Controller O 0 38. Estimated $ LOSS through LOST OPPORTUNITIES of
Manager. s u p e r v i s o r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 measurable): (Example: $3,000 in lost business
Systems Programmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 because ofdata corruption)
Data entry staff 00 1
Apolications Programmer . . . .......... 0 0
Systerns anatyst........ ........
.... 0 0 (estimated $1oss throughlostooportunities)
Machine or computer operator... 0
Other EDP staff 0 0 39. Estimated $ LOSS through THEFT and/or RECOVERY
Accourrtant.. COSTSfromabuse: (Example:$12,000 electronically
Clerical personnel..... 0 embezzied pius $1.000 in salary to recover from
Student . 0 0 data corruption + $2.000 in legal fees = $15.000)
Consultant 0 0· t
Not sure. 0 0 (estimated $ loss throughtheft and/or recovery costs)
Other... 0 0
Blease specity): (Main) 40. This incident was discovered._
(Choose as manyas appticabie)(Second) 0 by accider* by a system user
31. STATUS(ES) OFOFTENDER(S) 0
by accident by a systems st,11 memberoran
internal/EC)P auditorwhen incident occurred M.* Second 0 through a computer security investig,tion other
Offender Offender thaninaudit
Emploree..... .................... 0 0
Ex-efr,Oloyee.... ··--···········. 0 0
0 blaninternal/EDPaudit
0 through normal systems corlrots. like software or
Non-employee . . u up,ocedural cor,trots
Nd sure. 0 0 0 by ane,ternal audit
Other 0 0 0 notsure
(please specify): (Main) 0 other (please speci
fy):
(Second)
32. MOTIVATION(S) OFOFFENDER(S): Main 41. This incident was reported to-
Offender Offender (Choo$eis manyas .pplic.ble)
Ignoranceof proper professional conduct.. 0 0 0 Gorneone insidethelocalofganizatio
n
Personal gain 0 0 0 =neoneoutsidethe local orginiation
Misguided playfulness ............... 0 0 0 no
t sure
Maliciousness or reb,rge ............. 0 0
Notsure.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 41 Ifthis incident was reported to someone outside the
Other 0 0 localorganization. who was that?
Mleasespecify): (Main)
(Choose as many as aoolicable)
0 someone,1 drvisional or cocporate headquarters
(Second) 0 the media
0 the police
33. MAJOR ASSET AFFECTED or involved: 0 other authorities
(Chooseas miny as appticable) 0 notsure
0 Unauthorized use of corneuter seA·ice
O Disruptio n 01 comouter service 43. Please briefly describe the incident and what finally
0 Data happened to the perpetrator(s).
0 Hardware
0 Proiums
34. Wasthisa one-timeincider,tochad it beengoingon fora
period of time?__
(Choose one only)
0 one-time event
0 goir on for a period d time
O not sure
35. If a one.tirne incident. WHEN DID IT OCCUR?
Month Year
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